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Abstract 
In this thesis four economic incentives to reduce exhaust emissions of carbon dioxide are 
studied. The incentives are: the carbon dioxide tax, carbon dioxide differentiated vehicle tax, 
green car cash bonus and old car scrapping bonus. They are analysed and discussed in deeper 
theory. Where figures and numbers are available these are studied. Economically they are all 
more or less efficient. The environmental efficiency depends on peoples’ responses to the 
subsidies. The carbon dioxide tax provides efficiency for the environment in the long run, 
when demand elasticity for fuels is more elastic. As always caution needs to be taken when 
subsidies are used. There is a risk that the cash bonus increases the number of cars on the 
roads instead of just substituting old cars for new ones. A scrapping bonus might make 
people unwilling to scrap a car whenever a bonus is not present.  
The main conclusion drawn in the thesis is that the CO2 tax is important as a 
complement to all the other measures as it works counter productive to the 
environmentally unfriendly effects the subsidies might have.  
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1 Introduction 
Since the 1960’s the threat of global warming has been a well-known problem among 
scientists and people. As it is a global issue it is frequently debated all over the world and 
everyday we are reminded of the severity. Its consequences are shown in pictures and 
covered in articles and it is argued over what can, should or should not be done to lessen the 
burden on the environment. In 2003 the European Union decided that a cap and trade system, 
i.e. transferable permits to emit carbon dioxide, would be introduced from the 1st of January 
2005. The aim of the system was to realise the Kyoto protocol goals of 1997 through cost 
effectiveness.  The system comprises the industrial and energy sectors and covers about 50 
per cent of green house gas emissions (Hammar & Jagers, 2007, p. 377-378). A sector not 
included in the system is the transport sector. This sector was in 2007 responsible for 25 per 
cent of global CO2 emissions and nearly half of all the oil demanded in the world was 
demanded by the sector (Olsson et al, 2006, p 185). By far, the most common vehicle fuels 
used are diesel and petrol, both fossil fuels. Cars in Sweden that run on petrol or diesel are 
the ones that emit most carbon dioxide per car in all of Europe (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p 
164). Of total CO2 emissions in Sweden the transport sector emitted 22 per cent in 1990. Out 
of that passenger transport was accountable for 55 per cent (Bergman, 1996, p. 77).  
From 1960 to 1993 passenger car transports increased by almost 200 per cent in Sweden 
(Bergman, 1996, p 20). This number is far greater than the increase in GDP for the same 
period. A possible explanation is that demand for transport diversifies with GDP growth. 
Families of today, in general, contain of two working individuals. Thus the car becomes a 
necessary factor for the family to go about the daily activities efficiently; such as transport of 
children to day care etc. 
In 1989 two tonnes of carbon dioxide per capita were emitted in Sweden while the world 
per capita emission was 1.1 tonnes. Estimations were made in the middle of the 1990’s 
showing that to stabilise the concentration of carbon dioxide at the 19901 level world 
emissions would have to decrease by 60 per cent. If the aim is for the world to decrease 
  2
emissions so that all countries emit the same level proportionally, Sweden would have to 
decrease emissions by 80 per cent.  
Emission of green house gases (GHG) is a global problem. It does not matter where the 
emissions take place as the gases are not directly harmful to people and surroundings. The 
problem occurs when the gases are being accumulated in the atmosphere and improve the 
natural green house effect. The consequence – global warming – affects the whole planet. 
There is therefore a need for international agreement to reduce GHG emissions. But as the 
source of the emissions is not just companies and industries, but millions and millions of 
people driving cars in their daily life, there is also a need for a societal adjustment to get to 
the problem. According to Bergman (1996, p. 14) the way to do this is by information and 
economic incentives directed toward households and companies.  
  
   
1.1 Purpose 
The ways for households to decrease their contribution to pollution are either to decrease 
their use of sources of pollution in volume (in this case, drive less car) or by technical fixes, 
e.g. by replacing an old car with a new one emitting less carbon dioxide per kilometre (either 
run on renewable fuels or, due to technology improvements, emitting less CO2 per kilometre) 
(Bergman, 1996, p 15). According to a report from the Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p 48-49) the most efficient existing instruments to reduce 
the use of fossil fuels or replace fossil fuels with less CO2 emitting ones are the energy tax, 
the carbon dioxide tax and the vehicle tax exemption for motor vehicles driven by bio fuels. 
As mentioned above, the problem of CO2 emissions is global and not area specific and the 
sources of pollution are many. Economists seem to agree that economic incentives to reduce 
exhaust emissions are more efficient than the more traditional approach using command and 
control. Since there is no market price on pollution, only external costs, there is a market 
failure present. When the cost calculations for a good or an action are made, the company or 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 The year 1990 is commonly used as the base year for measuring CO2 and the governemnet has set the emission 
level as the goal for the Swedish emissions. 
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the individual does not include pollution in their calculations. If the level of emission is to be 
lowered, economic incentives are essential. They provide no force, they take the externalities 
into account and internalise them into the market (McKay et al, 1990, p. 2). However, that 
does not necessarily mean that the economic policies used today are efficient. The aim of this 
thesis is to study the following question: 
 
Are economic incentives to decrease CO2 emissions from passenger transport efficient? 
 
The policies chosen for the study are: the carbon dioxide tax, the carbon dioxide 
differentiated vehicle tax with tax exemption for green cars, the green car cash bonus and the 
scrapping bonus. All of them used, or will be used, in some extent in Sweden today. 
Efficiency will be considered as whether the environmental aim is achieved and if the policy 
at the same time can be economically justified. If the costs of reducing emissions are bigger 
than the benefits it may not be an optimal outcome to society. Minor attention will be drawn 
to distributional outcome to reflect the social aspects of the economy. This is important to 
mention as a policy can be efficient but at the same time have very undesired distributional 
effects. To evaluate the costs of these means discussion will also be done regarding the 
estimation of the costs that will occur if CO2 emissions are not abated. Sweden will be used 
as a case for the study. One of the reasons for that is that the interest for the question asked in 
this thesis awoke because of the green car cash bonus that has been tested in Sweden for two 
years but not been thoroughly evaluated yet.  
 
 
1.2 Delimitations  
Travelling by car has, for most distances, advantages in flexibility, comfort and in time spent 
on travelling than any other alternative has (Bergman 1996, p 63-72). For most people public 
transport and other types of collective means of transport is more of a complement to car 
travel than a substitute. An assumption supported by the fact that cross price elasticity for 
fuel and public transport suggests that these goods are not inversely related (Romero-Jordán 
& Sanz-Sanz, 2009, p. 157). For that reason public transport will not be considered a perfect 
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substitute for car travel in this thesis and therefore the effects of subsidising public transport 
will not be studied. This thesis will study passenger car transport, not goods transport. The 
interest of the study is to see how to get to households, not companies as many of them are 
already included by the cap and trade system.  
There are several instruments in use in Sweden today that works counter productive to 
the four measures studied in this thesis. Examples of those are free parking for employees 
providing by employers, free cars provided by employers, and the possibility of tax relief for 
travelling to and from work. These will not be more than briefly mentioned in this study. The 
four instruments will be studied in isolation from other effects.  
Another limitation applied in this thesis is that where numbers and figures are used as 
complements to the theories these will regard Sweden. This is based on the already 
mentioned notion that the Swedish passenger transport sector is of extra interest as cars in 
Sweden emit more than the average car in the EU. Another reason for using Sweden as an 
example is that interest for environmental issues is big there. It is therefore likely that much 
research will exist about Sweden and this issue.  
When fossil fuels are used a lot of other gases, such as nitrogen oxide, and particles are 
emitted. In the late 1980’s when the catalyst was introduced exhaust emissions of fossil fuels 
were rapidly reduced but not carbon dioxide. To decrease carbon dioxide exhaust emissions 
the alternatives are to improve energy efficiency, reduce emissions from exhaust and to 
substitute fossil fuels for renewable fuels (Bergman, 1996, p 20). Because of this and the 
other characteristic of CO2 - that it is a global problem - the thesis is delimited to study the 
decreasing of CO2 emissions.  
As the emission of green house gases has been notified the last 20 years when the 
consequences have been more visible it seems natural to delimit so that references are from 
the last 20 years.  
 
1.3 Method 
In this thesis I will not make any empirical research myself. Numbers and figures will be 
taken from databases. The purpose is not to test the instruments’ demand effects for 
significance but to analyse theoretically. Numbers will be presented but not tested. There will 
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be some empiricism in the thesis to complement the theoretical analysis. The reason for not 
finding the use of empiricism important in this analysis is that theories concerning pollution 
and external costs have been tested and are widely accepted within basic micro theory. There 
is no need to test them further but to see whether they can be complemented. What the thesis 
aims to do is to elaborate the theories and critically evaluate them.  
 
1.4 Disposition 
The thesis starts by going through the history of the use of economic incentives in Sweden 
leading up to what it looks like today. This section is followed by a presentation of what 
research has been done so far in the area and the literature and empiricism used in this study. 
Thereafter the basic theory of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies will be outlined. This will then 
be applied to both deeper theoretical discussions but also to some empirical numbers and 
facts. As the carbon dioxide tax is the one instrument affecting everyone driving a car driven 
by fossil fuels the discussions will start with that. It seems inevitable that it will be brought 
up during the whole discussion as it is present when decisions are taken regarding the other 
three instruments as well.  
 
 
  6
2 Background information 
2.1 History 
In the 1920’s a tax on the possession of a vehicle was introduced in Sweden. In the beginning 
this tax was earmarked for road maintenance and construction. Today it is not, but if failing 
to pay the tax today one loses the right to use the public roads. In 1993 the Swedish vehicle 
tax was differentiated depending on what kind of fuel was used. Cars driven by diesel were 
taxed higher than petrol cars as diesel was otherwise cheaper than petrol. When the tax bate 
on vehicle tax for Cars type 1, i.e. the most environmentally friendly cars, were abolished in 
1995 so were also the vehicle tax on these cars during their first five years of use. This policy 
shifted the aim of the vehicle tax towards becoming more environmentally oriented (Sjölin, 
2000, p. 37-38).  
Sales taxes on vehicles were introduced in Sweden in 1951. The aim was to balance the 
economy and to inhibit the fast growing trend of car use. Not until 1986 were sales taxes 
used as a mean of achieving environmental effects. Cars that were equipped with some kind 
of emission control were subsidised. In 1991 the sales tax was further developed as cars were 
divided into three groups depending on their effect on the environment and taxed based on 
what group they belonged to. The total tax burden was not supposed to change; the less 
environmentally friendly cars were taxed more heavily while the more environmentally 
friendly cars were taxed less. On the Swedish entry into the European Union in 1995 it was 
no longer possible for Sweden to use sales tax bates and they were therefore abolished 
(Sjölin, 2000, p. 37-38).  
Between 1974 and 1993 the Swedish government taxed car owners per kilometre driven. 
Compared to the sales tax and the vehicle tax this tax was efficient in the sense that it 
actually taxed the use of a vehicle and not just the possession of one. However, this tax was, 
just like the sales tax, abolished when Sweden adapted its taxation system to become a 
member of the European Union. The tax takes the form of an excise tax. The carbon dioxide 
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tax has steadily been raised since 1991 and today it constitutes SEK 2.44 per litre petrol. For 
diesel it is different as the fuels emit different amounts of CO2 (Skatteverket a; Skatteverket 
b).  
In 1976 a car scrapping bonus was introduced in Sweden to prevent people from 
abandoning cars in the countryside. This was abolished on the 1st of January 2007. The 
money left in the scrapping fund was used to release larger car scrapping bonuses for a 
couple of months later the same year. It lasted until the fund was emptied (Naturvårdsverket, 
2007, p. 176-177).  
On the 1st of May 2006 the vehicle tax was differentiated in two aspects. Hybrid cars and 
electric cars now pay less vehicle tax because they emit less CO2. Other cars are 
differentiated due to their weight or their CO2 emissions. Until then the vehicle tax had had 
fiscal purposes, now the environmental aspect was taken into account too (Naturvårdsverket, 
2007, p. 164).  
In March 2007 the Minister for the Environment in the Swedish Government, Andreas 
Carlgren, announced that a green car cash bonus was to be introduced from the 1st of April 
that year (DN, 2007-03-29). The bonus, on SEK 10,000, was to be paid in cash from April 
2007 until 31st December 2009. Electrical cars, hybrids and cars driven by renewable fuels 
were to be considered green cars. For conventional cars to qualify as a green car the emission 
of carbon dioxide from the car per kilometre could not exceed 120 grams. From the 1st of 
January 2010 the green car bonus will be replaced by a green car vehicle tax exemption 
(Olofsson et al, 2009). It will be retroactive for cars taken in use from the 1st of July 2009. 
Unlike the cash bonus the tax relief will be valid for company cars. The definition of green 
cars persists.  
The emissions of green house gases in Sweden have decreased since 1990. Since 1999 
they have been below the emission level of 1990 (PROP. 2008/09:162, 2009, p. 30 ff). In 
2007 the emissions were 9.1 per cent less than in 1990. The global emissions, however, have 
increased by 24 per cent since 1990 (PROP. 2008/09:162, 2009, p. 47). Total emissions from 
Swedish transport have increased by 12 per cent (PROP. 2008/09:162, 2009, p. 81). 
Passenger cars become more and more efficient all the time and thereby emit less. But the 
problem of comparatively less efficient cars in Sweden persists. Of the cars that have been 
registered during the last ten years the average car in Sweden emits 20-25 per cent more than 
the average car in Europe. At the same time the share of green cars is steadily increasing, out 
of the 5.2 million cars in Sweden 200,000, i.e. 3.9 per cent, are green cars (PROP. 
2008/09:162, 2009, p. 52).  
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2.2 Previous study 
Most of the scientific articles considering the area of the thesis are written in the 1980’s or 
the early 1990’s since the problem of global warming was not noticed until the late 1970’s. 
About a decade later the IPCC was founded by the UN and shortly after that agreements were 
made to decrease emissions of CO2 to the level of 1990. The problem was more and more 
notified, interest grew and with that research and studies. Most of the studies are from OECD 
countries (See McKay, Pearson & Smith; Johansson; Hammar & Jagers etc).  
Much of the research deals with trying to estimate the costs of allowing global warming 
to happen and the costs of preventing it. Some argue that the administrative costs of CO2 
taxes are so big that a tax is not justified. Others estimate the cost of CO2 emissions to be so 
big that a CO2 tax would need to be more than double of what it is today to lower the damage 
and cover the costs. Most studies deal with the CO2 tax, some study the vehicle tax. The 
conventional instruments to fight pollution have been command and control, setting 
standards for production or quotas for pollution. Much of the research, therefore, deals with 
arguing for economic incentives’ advantages compared to command and control. In this 
study the aim is not to compare economic incentives to command and control, merely to see 
whether they are effective in isolation or not. 
In an article by Meyer, Leimbach and Jaeger (2007) the characteristics of demand for cars 
are outlined. The results, that the car is a different good in different parts of the world, are 
presented in later sections. McKay, Pearson and Smith (1990) have written a very thorough 
article about the carbon dioxide tax and the vehicle tax and their potential for effectiveness. 
Romero-Jordán and Sanz-Sanz (2009) outline the problem of heavy vehicles and carbon 
dioxide emissions in and article from 2009. A book read but not used in this thesis is the 
book “Valuing Climate Change” by Samuel Fankhauser (1995). The results of this book are 
present in many other studies as the result is a very detailed base for the costs of global 
warming. 
The bonus systems of the green car cash bonus and the old car scrapping bonus have not 
been analysed and evaluated enough yet. Not surprising considering both of them have been 
actualised quite recently. My hope is that this study can make a contribution to fill the gap.  
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2.3 Literature 
This thesis has mainly been based on academic articles, course literature, newspaper articles, 
government propositions and reports from institutes.  
The course literature used is Paul Krugman and Robin Wells’ book Microeconomics for 
basic micro theories. From taking classes in public finance and tax studies I was well 
acquainted with Harvey Rosen and Ted Gayer’s book Public finance, which has been the 
base for theory but also for deeper analysis of public spending etc. Where more specific facts 
concerning the environmental part of the study was needed the book Environmental and 
Natural Resource Economics by Tom Tietenberg and Lynne Lewis has been a great 
complement.  
For deeper understanding of the theories concerning passenger transport and exhaust 
emissions I have read several academic articles covering this subject. I chose a few of them 
for my study. Among the authors of the articles are Hammar and Jagers who have written 
about people’s attitudes toward the CO2 tax.  Bengt Johansson has simulated what the 
transport sector would look like in 2015 to see what the chances of decreasing exhaust 
emissions are. 
A report ordered by the Swedish Environment Protection Agency and written by Lars 
Bergman has provided a base for the problematic concerning the transport sector and its 
response to economic incentives. Other reports have complemented Bergman’s study with 
estimates of how the economic incentives affect demand etc. Interest organisations, like Bil 
Sweden (Car Sweden), have contributed with the statistics that Statistics Sweden, the official 
institute for statistics, did not provide. For chronology and debates over the more recent 
policies that have not been covered by much research yet, i.e. the bonuses, I have turned to 
newspapers such as Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet (both of them major Swedish 
newspapers). A majority of the references used for the theory parts are from the beginning of 
the 1990’s but they have been complemented by facts and numbers from today. Most of the 
references used in this study are from OECD countries. As for this thesis it is not considered 
a problem since it deals with the Swedish car market. I have, however, been cautious with 
generalising my conclusions as the situation of countries outside the OECD is, in many ways, 
different. 
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3 Theory 
3.1 Green taxes  
The use of fossil fuels spills a negative externality on to society. When individuals and 
companies decide on how much fossil fuels they will use they consider a private cost in 
which the social cost is not included. Most of the people upon whom the costs of pollution 
fall have nothing to say in the matter (Krugman & Wells, 2004, p. 457-458). The polluters 
will therefore pollute more than the optimal level. There is a marginal social cost and a 
marginal social benefit of pollution meaning that up to a certain amount it would be 
inefficient not to pollute. Goods need to be produced and people need to be able to transport 
themselves between places and when this is done, there will be emissions and pollution. But 
the marginal benefit of pollutions is decreasing while the marginal cost of pollution is 
increasing. At a certain point they will intersect and that is where the optimal level of 
pollution is found. 
In figure 3.1 a Pigouvian tax is levied on consumers. Consumer price goes up, demand 
decreases and a new equilibrium is found. 
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The carbon dioxide tax is a green tax (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p 86). It was introduced for 
environmental reasons. Emitters, i.e. car drivers, now have to take into account the cost of 
emitting when deciding on how much to drive. The aim of taxing e.g. fuel in that way is not 
to gain revenue but to affect people’s habits. When the amount of taxes paid depends on how 
much of something one uses, e.g. petrol, one can decrease the amount paid by decreasing the 
use of that good, or by using it more efficiently. Hence, there are two ways to avoid paying 
much carbon dioxide tax, one can use the car less (e.g. swap to public transport) or one can 
buy a car that emits less, or none, carbon dioxide. The problem is to find the optimal tax level 
and to know the marginal costs and benefits of pollution. 
In the graph above it seems that consumers and producers share the burden from the tax 
equally. In reality the incidence of a tax depends on what the producer and consumer 
elasticities look like. When supply is perfectly inelastic (elastic) the incidence of a tax falls 
on the producers (consumers) and when demand is perfectly inelastic (elastic) the burden of 
the tax falls on the consumers (producers) (Rosen & Gayer, 2008, p. 305-313).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1, demand of fossil fuels, before and after tax 
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3.2 Subsidies 
So far externalities have been mentioned in a cost circumstance, i.e. negative externality. 
Externalities can be either negative or positive. In the formerly mentioned example of 
pollution the externality was negative. In the case of a positive externality the benefit of a 
good, an idea etc is bigger than just the marginal benefit that one consumer gets from 
consuming it. The marginal social benefit consists of the consumer’s marginal benefit plus 
the good’s marginal external benefit. By introducing a Pigouvian Subsidy into the market the 
optimal level of the good can be produced or consumed. A subsidy can take the form of a tax 
exemption on a good; it might be levied on consumers or producers. It keeps consumer price 
under, or producer price over, the market price (Krugman & Wells, 2004, p 469-471). The 
vehicle tax exemption for green cars is an example of this kind of subsidy, it is levied on 
consumers. In figure 3.2 we see that a subsidy increases producer price and decreases 
consumer price so that the optimal level of the good will be produced and demanded. The 
size of the subsidy is the area producer price minus consumer price times the optimal 
quantity minus the market quantity.  
 
 
 
Apart from tax exemption subsidies there are direct subsidies. These take the form of a direct 
transfer of money from the state to the consumer, or producer, of a good (Sjölin, 2000, p. 12). 
Figure 3.2, External benefit and Pigouvian subsidy 
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The green car cash bonus is an example of a subsidy keeping consumer price under the 
market price. Subsidies can also be motivated when there is a negative externality correlated 
with the good subsidised. In the case of the green car bonus or the scrapping bonus the 
externality is exhaust emissions. There is a comparative advantage of the average car being 
more environmentally friendly than the average car is today and therefore a subsidy to speed 
up the replacement of old cars with new ones is justified. Important to emphasise is that, in 
theory, these policies do not encourage the driving of a car, hence emitting, merely the 
owning of a car. In the case of a carbon dioxide differentiated vehicle tax the externality is 
the same, exhaust emissions. The differentiated tax makes it cheaper or more expensive to 
own a certain car. That ought to provide incentives to want to own a car emitting less carbon 
dioxide. The scrapping bonus can either be a direct transfer of money or a rebate on car sale 
so as to encourage the substituting of an old car for a new one.  
Just like with a tax, the incidence of a subsidy depends on consumer and producer 
elasticity.   
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Carbon Dioxide tax 
4.1.1 Environmental Efficiency 
The carbon dioxide tax is a proportional tax. It is also proportional to emissions as the 
emissions of carbon dioxide are directly proportional to the consumption of fossil fuels. 
There is no way of decreasing the CO2 emissions per litre fuel, only decrease the amount of 
fuel used per kilometre driven (Bergman, 1996, p.74). Nevertheless, the tax ought to 
encourage the invention of a way to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuels as that would 
decrease the tax burden. Taxes on petrol and diesel are differentiated depending on the 
environmental characteristics the fuels have, e.g. how much carbon they contain. According 
to the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and the Swedish Energy Agency it has 
been effective in substituting the less environmentally friendly types of fossil fuels for the 
more friendly ones. Nowadays almost all fossil fuels sold in Sweden are Environmental class 
1, i.e. the best from an environmental perspective (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p. 168).  
Bergman (1996, p 63-72) finds three different ways for households to limit the increased 
costs that taxes on emissions levy on them. The three categories are: Change of volume, 
change of structures and change of techniques. Change of volume means that due to the fact 
that travelling by car has now become more expensive households adapt their lifestyle to a 
way where they do not need the car as much as before. E.g. they might move closer to work, 
change their way of spending leisure time etc. The results of these actions are that the total 
volume of car travel and emissions from cars decrease. The second category is Change of 
structures. When the price of private car transport goes up people find a way of substituting 
the car for other means of transport. The car is the dominating means of transport for 
individuals, in 1993 four out of five passenger transports were done by car, but there are 
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many competitors. Within cities one can move around by foot, bicycle and bus or other forms 
of public transport while for long distances the substitutes would be, above others, train and 
airplane. For very long travels, or within and between big city centres, the alternatives might 
have advantages. There are, however, reasons to believe that the car has comparative 
advantages in the forms of flexibility, availability and comfort. There is need for a great 
change of cost for people to choose the competitors instead of the car. The last alternative, 
Change of Technique, occurs when people try to avoid fees by using newer techniques that 
have less environmental externalities. Either there is a technical development so that 
emissions are decreased, or there is an organisational change so that e.g. one big car is used 
instead of two small ones. The latter example is more related to goods traffic than passenger 
traffic. Bergman further states that technological change is most likely to occur out of 
economic incentives. Among economic incentives emission fees are the most efficient ones. 
By increasing the price on e.g. production, economic gains can be made by finding new 
solutions through technological improvements that reduce emissions. 
As stated above, structural changes might not take place until there is a remarkable 
increase in cost. The same is probably true for voluminous change. Demand elasticity for fuel 
and transport is approximated to be low in the short run, meaning that there would have to be 
a large increase in price before people actually choose to leave the car at home 
There are no real numbers calculated for the costs associated with these adaptations for 
households. The costs of technical improvements depend on the substitution possibilities to 
replace old technology vehicles with new ones and to substitute fossil fuels for other kinds of 
fuels (Bergman, 1996, p 15). The costs of decreasing the volume of consumption depend on 
how much one values these goods. This would imply that especially the latter one is highly 
subjective but both are possible to impact politically. By subsidising the alternatives the 
relative prices change.  
The transport related environmental problem is bigger than just carbon dioxide emissions. 
Bergman (1996, p 25-26) lists no less than six costs that the passenger transport sector 
generates on society. Those are: marginal congestion costs, marginal road maintenance costs, 
marginal surveillance costs, marginal risk of accident costs, marginal noise pollution costs 
and marginal emission costs. Further he states that the different costs have different impact in 
the countryside and in the city. While congestion and health related emissions are costs 
imposed on the city, accidental risks and noise pollution are problems in both cities and the 
countryside, although they might be a bigger problem in the cities than in the countryside. 
The more global environmental costs of emissions are caused by traffic everywhere but 
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countryside traffic is to blame for a larger share. If the use of private car driving is decreased 
due to the CO2 tax there is an advantage beyond its prime aim - all other costs of emissions 
and driving, as listed above, are decreased. If instead, it leads to the purchasing of a lot of 
new cars, the other negative effects are still present, although the emission of carbon dioxide 
will be decreased. 
4.1.2 Economic Efficiency 
When households due to a price distorting tax decrease their demand for a good, i.e. transport 
by car, there is a loss of welfare (Bergman, 1996, p. 84-85). This cost is very difficult to 
measure, as it is subjective. For some it might be the loss of not being able to move to the 
countryside because they can not afford to commute. For others it might be not being able to 
visit a friend. Some might need to change to a smaller car which is normally less safe.  
Both the income effect and the substitution effect suggest that demand for petrol will 
decrease due to the tax (Rosen & Gayer, 2008, p. 417). On the other hand, a survey made in 
1996 (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p. 160-161) concluded that most households projected that 
they would not decrease their car use even if the price on gasoline would go up by 50 per 
cent. The price elasticity on demand for petrol is 0.7 to 0.8 in the long run but in the short run 
it is estimated to be just 0.2 to 0.3. This means that in the short run people will not stop 
demanding fossil fuels because of a rise in price due to carbon dioxide tax. The deadweight 
loss would still occur even if demand is not changed. 
As stated above demand elasticity for fuels is low in the short run. This means that 
consumers will pay most of the actual tax when it is raised. Consumers find it hard to adapt 
to a higher fuel cost in the short run and therefore they are prepared to pay more. But we do 
not know anything about supply elasticity. If supply elasticity is inelastic the tax might as 
well fall even between consumers and producers. In the long run it might even fall mostly on 
producers as demand elasticity is higher in the long run. On the other hand, if supply 
elasticity is elastic it seems clear that the burden falls on consumers. 
The carbon dioxide tax is a green tax, meaning that it exists for environmental reasons 
and not due to fiscal purposes. It should therefore be evaluated from an environmental point 
of view, not from how much revenue it brings in. It is easy to see why. If the purpose is to 
decrease the emissions of CO2 the aim is in one sense to not gain any revenue at all from the 
tax, as that would mean that people do not consume CO2. However, from an economic 
efficiency point of view it is probably not desirable not to consume any fossil fuels, but to 
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consume less. The fact that the tax does not exist for fiscal reasons does not mean that there 
can not be an efficiency loss if there is a big deadweight loss present. The deadweight loss is 
a societal cost, the cost that the tax levies on society is therefore not just the direct cost of 
paying the tax, there is also a societal cost in the form of a welfare loss (Rosen & Gayer, 
2008, p. 331-335). The revenue might be used to pay for the growth loss that might be the 
result of not being able to consume as much CO2 as before.  
In 2008 the carbon dioxide tax contributed to the national budget with SEK 25.746 
billion. Bear in mind that this number is not only for the transport sector. But when compared 
to the green car cash bonus that cost SEK 322 million the same year it may be assumable that 
there is actually some money left over for a double dividend even if the CO2  is assumed to 
finance the subsidy (SCB a; SCB b). Taxing CO2 is commonly related to decrease of growth 
and therefore criticised. In a press release from the Swedish Ministry of Finance, the  
Ministry of Environment and Industry and Ministry of Employment and Communication 
(Sjöqvist et al, 2009) it was stated that economic incentives should move toward double 
dividend, that is, tax increases should be reflected by tax relieves. The idea is that by raising 
taxes on environmentally harmful things, such as emissions, the demand for them should go 
down so that less will be emitted. The revenues from the taxes will be used to decrease the 
income tax and the employer’s fee. The result of that will be the double gain, jobs will be 
created and GDP growth increase. (Leander, 2007-07-11) However, whether double dividend 
is positive for GDP growth or not is debated. This issue will not be further elaborated in this 
study.  
Quantifying environmentally related real costs is difficult. Especially for damage done by 
emissions such as carbon dioxide as the damage is done accumulatively and during a long 
period of time rather than a single year. Not only is time the limit, when quantifying damage 
of CO2 emissions geography too is a limit. The cost of reducing emissions of carbon dioxide 
is private, as much of the emissions come from short trips from households, while the costs 
of pollution is global. (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2009, ch. 18) In the climate proposition for 2009 
from the Swedish government (PROP. 2008/09:162, 2009, p. 71) some of the costs are listed. 
So far the effects have been visible within agriculture and forestry, the rising of the sea level, 
in health related issues, such as people dying from heat etc and other areas. As a result of 
these problems others follow, such as increased migration and streams of refugees. 
 
 
  18
4.1.3 Attitudes toward the carbon dioxide tax 
Sweden might be expected to be in favour of a CO2 tax as the country is “considered one of 
the most environmentally engaged countries and has one of the most eco-concerned 
populations in the world” (Hammar & Jagers, 2007, p. 378). On the other hand, as Hammar 
and Jagers (2007, p 378 ff) further discuss, there is a high tax burden of almost 50 per cent of 
GDP in Sweden and the CO2 tax is already high compared to other countries. Opinion polls 
show that the CO2 tax, as well as further increase of the tax, receives much dislike. The 
authors ascribe some of this aversion to the fact that all kinds of taxes will be disliked in a 
country that already imposes high taxes. Self-interest also plays a part in the explanation to 
the disliking of the tax - this tax is noticeable for most people. For low income groups that 
are dependent on private transport the tax is extra harsh. Low income households already 
spend a bigger share of their income on fuel and energy than households in the higher income 
brackets. McKay et al (1990, p. 14) show that when the petrol tax in UK was increased by 
SEK 1.8 per litre2 (original figures 55 Pence per gallon) the richest decreased their 
consumption of petrol by 7.8 per cent while the poorest decreased it by 11.3 per cent. It is 
likely to believe that by decreasing their demand for fuel a deadweight loss occurred and they 
ended up with less utility than before. In figure 3.1 the deadweight loss is depicted in the 
triangle named A. However, when statistically tested for significance there was none found 
regarding whether income bracket is related to how one feels about higher CO2 tax. Being a 
car driver, on the other hand, affected one’s feelings toward the tax. People that used a car on 
a daily basis were less supportive of a CO2 tax increase than other groups. It is not easy to 
estimate how many people have access to a car but knowing that there in Sweden are 5.2 
million cars registered compared to a population of approximately 9 million a guess is that a 
lot of people are affected by the CO2 tax.  
The fact that people do not like a tax such as the CO2 tax is not very surprising. The 
benefits of taxing pollution take place in the future while the costs are imposed now. With no 
tax it would be the other way around. All the benefits of pollution could be used now, and 
then the costs would be very great in the future. Irrespective of the tax being popular or not, 
estimates by request from the Swedish government suggest that total emissions of Swedish 
based green house gases would have been 20 per cent higher in 2010 compared to 1990 if the 
taxes had not been raised since then (PROP. 2008/09:162, 2009, p. 62). According to 
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Fankhauser, as the taxes were designed in 1993 actually the entire transport sector was 
subsidised when the norm for taxation was determined from the social cost to society of 
emissions (Sjölin, 2000, p 41). It can once again be stressed that the tax internalises the 
external social costs of pollution. People are not supposed to like the tax. They are supposed 
to dislike it so that they behave in a way that makes them not needing to pay the tax. But of 
course it is difficult to implement a tax that is much disliked when fighting for votes. And if 
there is a risk that many cars will be filled up in neighbouring countries levying lower CO2 
taxes the tax rate might be set too high. As the tax is not supposed to have fiscal purposes it 
should not matter for fiscal reasons where cars are filled but if fuels are cheaper somewhere 
else the environmental goals are not reached as, according to basic micro theory, cheaper fuel 
means more consumption.  
Studies have shown that consumers may have a faulty perception of the value of saving 
fuel. One survey found that consumers only consider the first three years of fuel consumption 
when they make decisions regarding buying a green car or a non-green car. Thereby, they 
might undervalue possible fuel savings by up to 60 per cent (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2009, p. 
458). This fact might suggest that there is a need for complementary measure to tax when the 
aim is to reduce CO2 emissions. When even more tax exemption or advantages are present 
people might be one step closer toward seeing the real value of choosing to drive a green car. 
The following sections will discuss the possibilities.    
4.2 The green car cash bonus 
4.2.1 Environmental efficiency 
Demand for transport is positively correlated with growth in GDP. Knowing that, it might 
seem futile to encourage the use of more environmentally friendly cars as the increase in 
transport still will increase pollution. In 2003 the average passenger car in Sweden weighed 
about 100 kilos more than the average EU car (Zervas & Lasarou, 2008, p 250). Suggesting, 
as heavier cars normally consume more fuel, that only by changing the trend of heavy cars in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Calculated by author. 55 Pence = SEK 6.78 and one gallon = 3.79 litres 
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Sweden could the emissions decrease. To return to Bergman’s three ways of escaping a fee 
this bonus is part of the Change of technique. If the bonus increases the demand for cars with 
better techniques it will also be supplied.  
Subsidies are commonly analysed when there is a positive externality associated with the 
good subsidised. It might be subsidising education which is common in many countries or 
the maintaining of a natural reserve of some kind (Rosen & Gayer, 2008, p. 136-137). In this 
example the good subsidised is in ways already mentioned not good for the environment, 
only better than the alternative. The aim of the subsidy is to minimise a negative externality. 
In his study “Strategies for reducing emissions of air pollutants from the Swedish 
transportation sector” Bengt Johansson (1995) tries different future scenarios of what the 
exhaust gases from the transport sector might look like in 2015. Total transport demand 
between 1990 and 2015 is increased by 30 per cent. This level of transport is then multiplied 
by three different levels of average technology that are assumed to possibly be the case for 
2015. These are Average sold technology where the average car in 2015 has an efficiency, 
and emits as much, as the average sold vehicle in 1991; Best available technology where the 
average car in 2015 has the average energy efficiency and emission factors equal to the best 
commercially available vehicles in 1991; and Improved technology where the energy 
efficiency and emission standards are those of the vehicles that were available as prototypes 
but not in stores in 1991.  
What is considered in the study is partly whether the different technology levels can help 
stabilise the Swedish CO2 emission level in 2000 to the level of 1990 in Sweden as is the 
goal set by the Swedish Government. If the goal is to stabilise the global emission level to 
that of 1990, and to be done to equal levels globally, Sweden has to reduce the emission of 
CO2 by 80 per cent compared to the 1990 level. 
The result of the study is that none of the technology standards leads to a decrease of CO2 
exhaust emissions by 80 per cent. In the average sold technology the emissions are even 
increased by 20 per cent while in the best available technology scenario the emissions are 
almost that of 1990. The increase in volume of transport works in the opposite direction as 
that of the technology improvements. If the transport volume would be the same in 2015 as 
in 1991 the emissions would be remarkably lower. If the best available technology was used 
and the level for transport was to remain the same as in 1991 the CO2 emissions would 
decrease by 24 per cent. The conclusions that Johansson draws from the study is that 
improvements in technology and increased use of renewable sources are important to reduce 
CO2 emissions from exhaust. The implications Johansson suggests are economic incentives 
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such as emission differentiated vehicle taxes and fuel taxes. Although the target is not 
reached in this scenario it is obvious that there is a big difference in emissions from cars with 
different technologies. Already in 1995 there was technology available that could drastically 
decrease emissions if it was to be used instead of the average technology used at the time. 
Assuming that the scrapping bonus and/or the green car cash bonus actually speeds up the 
replacement of older cars with new ones characterised by improved technology it might be a 
policy worth undertaking.  
 
4.2.2 Economic efficiency 
The bonus is not affecting the price of the car when it is bought in stores. It is a cash bonus 
paid by the Swedish Road Administration six months after buying the car. But as buying a 
new car is the only way of getting the bonus it can still be seen as a reduction in car price. 
Due to the green car cash bonus the relative price of green cars in terms of non-green cars has 
been altered (Krugman & Wells, 2004, p. 263 f) meaning that green cars are now relatively 
cheaper than before and demand should therefore increase. This is true for those already 
planning on buying a car. For those who had not planned on buying a car in the first place 
there might also be an increase in demand due to the cash bonus. The relative price of green 
cars has been altered in terms of all other goods as well as in terms of other cars (see figure 
4.1). 
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Buying a green car is now relatively cheaper than buying other goods and demand should 
therefore increase. This implies that, when a cash bonus like this one is introduced, people 
who otherwise would not have bought a car might now buy one and with more cars in use the 
number of sources of pollution increases. During April 2007, the first month of the green car 
bonus, 14.3 per cent of the cars sold were green cars. This number can be compared to 11.2 
per cent the same month 2006. The total increase in car sales was 9.8 per cent (E24, 2007-05-
02). The increase in green car sales numbers is bigger than the increase in total sales 
numbers. But important to stress is that the definition for green cars changed with the 
implementation of the cash bonus. Until April 2007 green cars were cars driven by 
alternative fuels or electricity. Since 2007 conventional cars are included by the definition as 
well, if emitting up to 120 grams CO2 per kilometre. One should therefore be very cautious 
about drawing conclusions concerning demand for green cars.  
Whether car price actually decreases with the bonus depends on the behaviour of the car 
salesmen. It is possible that car salesmen raise the car prices due to the cash bonus. If sales 
numbers increase because of the bonus there is marginal to do that without decreasing 
revenue. This assumption presupposes that producers have the power to set prices. If prices 
are raised there is always a risk that consumers turn to another car dealer. In the end prices 
might go back to their original level. It is important, however, to stress that this depends on 
whether the car dealers sell the same cars and people see different cars as identical goods or 
not (Krugman & Wells, 2004, p. 380-381). If different cars yield different utility levels for 
Quantity of 
green cars 
Quantity of 
none-green 
cars 
/All other 
goods 
Before 
bonus 
After bonus
Consumption 
possibility curves 
Made by author 
Figure 4.1, Relative price green cars in terms of non-green cars/All other goods 
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the consumer and the first choice car is only sold by one car dealer nearby the dealer might 
actually be able to make some profit by raising the price on that car. 
In one aspect, it can be argued that green cars should cost less than non-green cars. In that 
way the cost better reflects their effect on the environment. On the other hand, in reality a 
car’s environmental effect depends on how much it is driven, thereby emitting, not on the car 
itself if it is just left standing. In that way, the carbon dioxide tax seems like a more fair way 
of paying for transport related environmental costs. But that is not to say that a cash bonus is 
not desirable. There are considerable relative gains to be made if the car that is driven the 
most, thereby emitting the most, is a green car instead of a non-green car.  
The green car cash bonus is meant to increase the demand for green cars, not to 
encourage driving, and thereby consumption of fossil fuels. The prices of fossil fuels do not 
change because of the bonus. One would, however, have to know the cross-price elasticity of 
demand between the goods “passenger car” and “passenger car fuels” before drawing the 
conclusion that demand for fossil fuels will not increase if demand for cars increases. If the 
goods are complements, which is a reasonable assumption as one can not drive a fuel driven 
car without fuel, the demand for fuel should increase with the demand for cars. How much 
demand goes up depends on how strong complements cars and fuels are (Krugman & Wells, 
2004, p. 121). Two goods are perfect complements when only the consumption of both goods 
in the same ratio yields utility (Krugman & Wells, 2004, p. 268-269). The consumption of 
one good without the other yields no utility. Owning a car but no fuel, or owning fuel but no 
car yields no transport. But, a thought is that it is still possible that the possession of a car 
yields some utility, in the form of status etc. Cars and fuels may therefore not be perfect 
complements, but nonetheless complementary goods, meaning that demand for fuels will 
increase if demand for cars increases. The CO2 works counterproductive to this effect. Bear 
in mind that the, by far, most common fuels in the world are diesel and petrol – both fossil 
fuels.  
Car demand is positively correlated with income. In a study by Meyer et al (2007, p 
6335) demand elasticity for cars in different regions of the world show that in developed 
nations cars are normal goods, demand for them increases proportionally with income. In 
earlier stages of their development, as for developing nations today, it was/is a luxury good. 
When income increases, demand for cars increases even more. This ought to suggest that 
means to affect people’s decision on what kind of car to buy can (proportionally) give more 
positive results in developing countries than in the developed world, e.g. Sweden. But that is 
not to say that using these means in Sweden is futile.  
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Buying a new car is not a fast decision, renewing an entire car fleet is a process. As a car 
costs much more than the SEK 10,000 bonus it is questionable who can afford to buy a new 
car when the bonus only is a marginal part of the price? But, from the environmental point of 
view that is not necessarily bad. When those who can afford a new car decide to buy one it is 
likely that their old car will be sold on the second hand market. In the next part of the chain, 
people with really old cars might decide to scrap their cars and buy a new one on the second 
hand market. If demand for new cars is increasing due to the cash bonus it is likely to assume 
that supply for second hand cars will increase, which might lead to a fall in price, which 
might increase demand. In the end, then, even those not buying a new car, but a second hand 
car will gain from the bonus, as they might be able to buy a newer car than the one they have 
got now. A car that is e.g. ten years younger than their previous car will probably consume 
less fuel meaning that they will also gain from not having to use as much fuel, and thereby 
pay as much tax as before. 
Subsidising a good means that there is a cost that needs financing. To be able to do this 
the government will either have to decrease another expenditure or increase taxes. If taxes 
are to be increased it is important to know how this might affect efficiency. A good that is 
characterised by high demand elasticity is not a good idea to tax for fiscal reasons since that 
would not generate the revenue that is wished for. A good where demand elasticity is low, on 
the other hand, may lead to large revenue. It is, however, important to make sure that this is 
not earned on the expense of a big excess burden. That way, efficiency is still distorted.  
Today there are no specific rules concerning company cars with an environmental aim. 
This in spite of the fact that 25 per cent of all new cars bought are company cars. As 
company cars are provided by work there are no economic incentives at all to choose a 
greener car (That is if fuel is provided by work as well, otherwise there is the CO2 tax). At the 
time it also seemed that company cars tended to be heavier and more fuel consuming than the 
average car (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p. 170). This implies that there is room for making the 
policies in Sweden even more efficient.  
In 2009 it was announced that the cash bonus would be abolished later the same year. 
Instead, new green car owners would not pay vehicle tax during their first five years of use. 
Company cars would now qualify for the benefit. The Minister for the Environment of the 
Swedish Government, Andreas Carlgren, motivated the decision with “It is not reasonable in 
the long run that the tax payers are paying our car purchases. Therefore it has been 
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reasonable to replace the green car cash bonus with a long term solution”3 (Carlén, e24, 
2009). The vehicle tax is discussed in the next section. 
4.3 Vehicle tax  
4.3.1 Environmental efficiency 
Private road transport is taxed relatively heavy because of the environmental effect this 
sector has. Apart from the formerly discussed CO2 tax the vehicle tax too is supposed to 
reflect the costs (Sjölin, 2000, p. 12). Since 2007 a vehicle tax differentiated by the amount 
of carbon dioxide emitted has been levied on Swedish car owners. Electric cars and hybrids 
were assigned a group called class 2005. According to a report by the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency, vehicle taxes differentiated by exhaust emissions have 
been important for emission reduction in Sweden. The report further states that for this kind 
of tax to be efficient it should be rather sharp (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p 167).  
The government has set more efficient energy use as one of the most important concepts 
when trying to achieve environmental objectives. When the vehicle tax is set at the same rate 
for all cars it can be perceived as a lump sum tax paid once a year. In this form it does not 
discourage people from driving as once it is paid the marginal cost of driving an extra 
kilometre is merely the fuel cost; the cost of owning the car is still the same. When 
differentiated for engine size or emission per kilometre it still does not discourage the use of 
a car but it can affect what kind of car is driven. The same amount of tax revenue could still 
be raised but less from low-emission cars and more from high-emission cars. After while, as 
people start swapping from high-emission to low-emission cars, revenue would decrease. 
The same would be true for the CO2 tax. Revenues would decrease as people adapt to the tax. 
From en environmental perspective, however, the CO2 tax has an advantage. It not only 
encourages people to buy a more environmentally friendly car, it also discourages people 
from driving (McKAy, 1990, p. 15-16). The fact that the vehicle tax and the bonus, as they 
are designed today, do not differ between cars that emit different levels of CO2 once they 
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qualify for the bonus/bate is a clear disadvantage (SFS, 2006:227, §8 & §9). While the CO2 
tax provides incentives to always reduce exhaust emissions further the tax exemption/cash 
bonus is the same for everyone irrespective of whether the car is a fossil fuel driven car 
emitting 120 grams of CO2 per kilometre driven or a car driven by renewable sources, not 
emitting any CO2 at all. This ought to imply that a carbon dioxide differentiated vehicle tax is 
more efficient when it is not combined with a tax exemption for some cars. That way it, just 
like the CO2 tax, always provides further incentives for buying an even less emitting vehicle. 
Since 2006 the vehicle tax has been SEK 360 per car and year up to 120 grams CO2 
emitted per kilometre (SFS, 2006:227, §8 & §9). For cars that emit more than 120 grams per 
kilometre there is an extra SEK 15 per gram CO2 emitted per kilometre. It is now debated 
whether the extra fee should be SEK 20 instead of SEK 15 (Carlén, e24, 2009). At first sight 
it might seem like this tax is a “polluter pays” tax and therefore efficient in making people 
pay for the cost they bring. However, a car that is not well maintained consumes more fuel 
than a new car (STR, 2006, p. 223), meaning that for this tax to really make the polluter pay 
it would need to be very administratively advanced. Compare a car-owner having a car that 
emits 130 grams of CO2 per kilometre and maintaining the car so that three years after 
buying the car it still emits 130 grams to another car owner with a car that originally emitted 
120 grams but three years later the car emits 140 per kilometre due to bad maintaining. The 
former car owner will always pay for exactly the contributed emission, while the latter one 
will pay too little. To correct this would of course be very expensive administratively. Once 
again, there is the CO2 tax complementing the other incentives. A badly maintained car will 
soon start costing more in fuel consumption and therefore there are still incentives to 
maintain the car.  
The government concluded in the Climate Proposition (PROP. 2008/09:162, 2009, p. 82-
83) that incentives play an important role in substituting fossil fuels for renewable ones on 
the market. Among the alternatives, tax abatements for cars driven by renewable fuels, are 
mentioned. The importance of tightening the definition of a green car is also stressed. This 
should be done without affecting cars already granted with the tax relief. Since all fossil fuel 
driven cars are bad for the environment it depends on where the limit is drawn at the moment 
if a car is subsidised or taxed. The limit today, that cars can emit 120 grams of CO2 and still 
be a green car, will be lowered in the future. This means that those cars that from the 1st of 
July 2009 will be taxed negatively might be taxed positively in the future.  
Another problem when subsidising a certain type of car or fuel is to know which ones (if 
any) are going to be all good in the long run. E.g. in the United States in the 1990’s methyl 
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tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) was added to petrol to make it burn cleaner (Tietenberg & 
Lewis, 2009, p. 453). After a while it was discovered that it contributed to the contamination 
of groundwater and drinking water and its consequences was therefore worse than what it 
was aimed at fighting. When things like this change rapidly it can affect both the economy 
and individuals. In E24 it was stated that insecurity prevailed on the market and that it is 
important to be consequent (E24, 2008-01-03). Before being sure that e.g. ethanol really will 
be demanded in the long run, and not just now when ethanol driven cars are subsidised, it is 
likely that neither the industry nor people are willing to take the risk of investing in it. To 
return to the former paragraph concerning the tightening of the green car definition, it is 
important  that the government is clear about how the bonus will change in the future so that 
people do not get confused and annoyed.  
It is difficult to determine how much emissions can be reduced with the vehicle tax as an 
economic instrument. Almost all cars emit carbon dioxide and demand for cars is increasing. 
Another problem, valid for the whole thesis, is that Sweden is such a small part of the total 
market for cars and fuels so that even if results were successful here the total effect would be 
marginal (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p 168).  
 
4.3.2 Economic efficiency 
A subsidy means that another tax needs to be raised or another expense needs to be 
withdrawn to finance the subsidy. According to the inverse elasticity rule goods that are not 
related in consumption should be taxed inversely proportional to demand elasticity (Rosen & 
Gayer, 2008, p. 357). This means that goods where demand is characterised by low elasticity 
should be taxed highly and vice versa. The reason for this is that when demand elasticity is 
high taxing the good is pointless out of fiscal reasons. When price goes up, demand will go 
down and tax revenues might even decrease. As discussed before, demand elasticity for 
petrol is low in the short run meaning that CO2 is not just efficient for environmental reasons, 
but also because it brings in large revenues to the state. But that is in the short run, demand 
elasticity for petrol is higher in the long run. Demand elasticity for cars is estimated to be 
inelastic in the long run (Stephenson, 2007). If the vehicle tax can affect the demand for cars 
the demand will not change very much in the long run, meaning that the vehicle tax too can 
be used for fiscal purposes. The carbon dioxide differentiated vehicle tax yielded SEK 
11.307 billion in 2009. Revenues from the vehicle tax has never been this high before. (SCB 
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a; SCB b) This might imply that the vehicle tax itself has a chance of financing the tax 
exemption for green cars that will be introduced in July 2009. 
One problem with the tax exemption is that when the same amount of transport can be 
achieved to a less cost, we might start demanding more transport, as it becomes relatively 
cheaper, and thereby using more fuel (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p 73-74). In this case the term 
transport includes the cost of buying, owning and driving a car. When the cost of owning is 
decreased, the sum of these three costs is decreased. On the other hand we have the CO2 tax 
working counter productive. A tax on fuel makes driving the car more expensive.  
The government not only sees costs related to preventing global warming, also business 
possibilities opening up due to the great need for technical development and improvement 
(PROP. 2008/09:100, p. 54). There is a possibility of new jobs being created. The demand for 
cars and new technology in other areas is believed to have the potential of being positive for 
the economy. 
 
  
4.4 The scrapping bonus 
 
There are two economically efficient ways of speeding up the process of scrapping old, 
polluting cars. One is to make it more expensive to own an old car, e.g. by increasing the 
registration fee for old cars that pollute more. The other option is to provide a bonus for those 
choosing to retire a car of that kind (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2009, p. 458). The costs of buying, 
owning and driving a car have been discussed. The scrapping bonus can be seen as the 
opportunity cost of owning a car. The pros and cons of substituting old cars for new ones 
have been outlined in the section above. The scrapping bonus will now be discussed 
specifically. When choosing to scrap an old car a one time cash bonus is paid to the former 
car owner. Relatively it has become more expensive to own an old car, depending on 
people’s preferences some should now choose to dispense with their car.  
During the economic slump in the spring of 2009 interest organisations have started to 
request a scrapping bonus for old cars in Sweden. Germany, France and Italy, countries that 
have introduced an old car scrapping bonus, have all seen their new car sale number increase 
during the crisis, contra wise to all other countries. This rise in demand has been ascribed to 
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the scrapping bonus. There are, however, countries that have introduced a scrapping bonus 
among the countries where sales numbers have decreased. According to the interest 
organisation Bil Sweden, this is not an argument to turn down the bonus. They estimate that 
sales numbers would have been even lower without the bonus. Swedish politicians points to 
the fact that a green car cash bonus already has been implemented to defend the rejection of a 
proposed scrapping bonus in Sweden (Bilsport, 2009-04-17).  
As was mentioned in section 2.1 there has been a scrapping bonus in Sweden until 2007. 
In 2007 a fund was set up to pay out a larger scrapping bonus than the one that had been paid 
out before. The temporary bonus followed the first come, first served rule. By the time the 
fund was emptied 25,000 cars had been scrapped (Svt, 2009-02-08). Energy advisers warn 
about a risk related to grants. The reason for that is that when the government starts 
subsidising a good people might expect more grants and therefore await taking action to see 
if more things will be subsidised or receive grants (Naturvårdsverket, 2007, p 77-78). A 
speculation of a problem that might occur when a scheme like the scrapping fund is 
implemented and then taken away is that few people will be willing to scrap their old car 
afterwards. If they believe that there is a chance that the scrapping bonus will come back they 
will wait to scrap the car. The result is that there are more old cars still in use than would 
have been the case otherwise. 
The debate over the scrapping bonus goes in two directions. On the one hand it could be a 
policy worth overtaking if it can be proven that it would reduce the amount of old, polluting 
cars on the Swedish roads. Others argue over whether it is justifiable to implement because it 
increases the sales of new cars in Sweden and thereby contribute to GDP growth. If the 
bonus is to contribute to growth of the Swedish economy the bonus would not only have to 
be earmarked for buying a new car but also for buying a car produced in Sweden. A possible 
problem is that a person owning a car old enough to qualify for a scrapping bonus might not 
be able to afford buying a new car. If a scrapping bonus was paid out, a second hand car 
might be of interest but if that is not an option maybe instead the car will never be scrapped. 
A bonus that was not earmarked, on the other hand, could have an effect of the opposite kind. 
People who would not have scrapped their old car otherwise might then decide to dispense 
with their car, which would mean that the risk of a certain high emitting car ever being used 
again is abolished. A possible problem with a not-earmarked bonus, on the other hand, is that 
there is no control of what will be the effect of the money that is paid out. If it all goes to 
non-environmentally friendly consumption the effect of the bonus is diminished. If it is 
motivated as a stimulus for the economy it needs to be conditioned both by the buying of a 
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new car but also that the car should be produced in the country where the old car is scrapped. 
If the scheme is environmentally motivated it is enough to pay the bonus when a car is 
scrapped.  
The car producer Renault has implemented their own scrapping bonus. When showing a 
receipt from a scrap dealer one gets a SEK 20,000 discount on a new Renault. Adding the 
SEK 10,000 cash bonus to that the total rebates when buying a new car is SEK 30,000 
(Automatsport, 2009-05-09). Cars from Renault have now become relatively cheaper 
compared to all other brands, for those who possess a car older than ten years. When, as in 
this case, the scrapping bonus is implemented by a car company and not by the government 
financing is provided. The only downside to it might be that people might receive less benefit 
from their car if they feel that they need to choose a certain car type because it provides the 
bonus. If they would have chosen another brand in the absence of the bonus there might be a 
deadweight loss present. For those who would have bought a Renault anyway, consumer 
surplus has increased.  
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5 Summary 
In this section the pros and cons of the four policies and their potential for efficiency will be 
outlined in a table. 
Table 5.1 Pros and cons of the four policies studied 
 
Policy/ Effect Pros Cons 
Carbon 
dioxide tax 
¾ Decrease demand for fossil fuels 
¾ Incentives to always further 
reduce use of fossil fuels  
¾ Complement other policies 
¾ All other emissions decrease if 
transport  is decreased 
¾ Revenue 
¾ Double dividend 
¾ Demand elasticity 
for fossil fuels low 
in the short run 
¾ Deadweight loss 
¾ Dislike Æ 
increases risk for 
cheating  
 
Greens car 
cash bonus 
 
¾ Distorts relative prices between 
green and non-green cars 
¾ Increase supply of better cars on 
2nd hand market 
¾ Encourage development of 
better techniques 
¾ Subsidises negative 
externality 
¾ Increases demand 
for a 2nd car 
¾ Financing 
¾ Demand for cars up 
Æ demand for 
fuels up 
Carbon 
dioxide 
differentiated 
vehicle tax 
with tax 
exemption for 
green cars 
¾ Incentive to buy greener car 
(non-green cars) 
¾ Encourage development of 
better techniques 
¾ Revenue (taxes) 
¾ Demand for new techniques Æ 
GDP up 
¾ No incentive to buy 
greener car (green 
cars) 
¾ No incentive to 
maintain car 
¾ Increase demand 
for transport? 
¾ Financing 
Old car 
scrapping 
bonus 
¾ Relatively more expensive to 
possess a “bad” car 
¾ Demand for new cars could 
mean higher GDP  
¾ People get used to 
the subsidy 
¾ Financing 
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6 Conclusions 
After discussing and studying these four economic incentives and their potential to decrease 
carbon dioxide emissions from exhaust it seems that they all, although in differing extent and 
ways, can contribute to the objective. At the same time they also are economically justified 
as they provide incentives to adapt and decrease emissions, not force.  
It might seem a bit odd that when trying to internalise the costs of pollutions into the 
market two, and partly a third, of the measures used actually subsidise the polluting actions. 
From the environmental point of view it might seem like the best alternative is to increase the 
carbon dioxide tax so much that people simply choose not to drive a car anymore. But the 
loss of utility from having to choose a less desirable option of transport might be bigger than 
the gain from decreasing exhausts emission.   
While the carbon dioxide tax might have the effect that people keep their car, but using it 
less in the long run, the bonus might make people buy a new car and not needing to drive the 
car less, as a green car means less fuel consumption. As has been stated before, a potential 
problem with the green car cash bonus and the vehicle tax exemption is that those people 
owning cars that pollute the most probably can not afford to buy a new car even if the price is 
SEK 10,000 less. With that in mind it might actually be motivated to implement a scrapping 
bonus as well. If that can make people see the value of dispensing with a car that they might 
not use much anyway it will have positive effects. People owning cars they hardly ever drive 
might suddenly see the chance of getting cash for the car and scrap it without buying a new 
one. In this scenario the CO2 tax is of importance as well, as higher fuel costs might be the 
reason that people potentially do not use a car they own much.  
Although the transport sector show some improvements concerning carbon dioxide 
emissions it is important to remember that there are other measures working side by side with 
economic incentives. Swedes are, as mentioned above, environmentally enlightened. When 
studying incentives it is easy to ascribe improvements in emissions to these policies but some 
might just be due to information and the fact that people actually care about the environment 
and are prepared to make some sacrifices to contribute.  
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Counterproductive to these economic measures are both trends of having big vehicles in 
Sweden but also other measures going in other directions. Take the free parking and the 
company cars provided by many companies meaning that people do not actually have to take 
the fees into account.  
As the discussion above has outlined, there are many potential problems with the 
measures. The green car cash bonus might make people buy a car without getting rid of the 
old one. When keeping two cars it does not matter how much better the newer car is than the 
older one. The result will be more pollution. There is also the energy cost of producing a new 
car to take into account. People that buy a car in spite of high CO2 taxes probably see the 
benefits bigger than the cost of fuels, meaning that for many people it is probably justified to 
pay the price of driving if they have once decided to buy a car. As the carbon dioxide tax hits 
low income groups harder and makes these groups decrease their fuel consumption more 
than rich people it is probably more efficient in a poorer country as the majority of Swedes 
are middle class. But that is not to say that it is not efficient in Sweden. Another problem, 
valid for the whole thesis, is that Sweden is such a small part of the total market for cars and 
fuels so that even if results were successful here the total effect would be marginal. 
It is difficult to implement policies that bring costs to people as it might be perceived as 
only costs are visible today and the benefits are for the future. This, of course, is a 
misperception as we have harvested the benefits of pollution for years while the costs of us 
doing that will be left for the future. But it shows some of the complexity concerning levying 
costs on households.  
While the CO2 tax will probably inhibit growth, the bonus systems may actually ignite 
growth. This might lead to a situation where policies like the bonuses are preferred to tax 
systems as they can be economically motivated. They are also probably more popular among 
people as they do not levy a direct cost on them. This might be problematic from the 
environmental point of view if it means that more cars will be on the roads and cars will be 
driven a lot if there are not enough taxes to inhibit that.  
For economic efficiency it is equally important to evaluate all of these measures as long 
as they are used. If they distort a cost on society and people that is bigger than can be 
justified they have to be revised. From the environmental point of view it is even more 
important to evaluate the bonus and tax exemptions systems as they actually subsidise 
activities that are not entirely good. If it for example leads to more cars in use instead of cars 
being substituted for better cars then it is hard to justify the presence of the subsidy for 
environmental reasons. The main finding in this thesis, as has been mentioned several times 
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in the discussion sections, is that when subsidising cars in different ways the CO2 tax is of 
great importance as a complement so that demand for transport over all do not increase. 
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